Cybertrespass by Epstein, Richard A.
University of Chicago Law School
Chicago Unbound
Journal Articles Faculty Scholarship
2003
Cybertrespass
Richard A. Epstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/journal_articles
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Chicago Unbound. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal
Articles by an authorized administrator of Chicago Unbound. For more information, please contact unbound@law.uchicago.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard A. Epstein, "Cybertrespass," 70 University of Chicago Law Review 73 (2003).
Cybertrespass
tion, for while they may not be perfect, at least they have done their
job.
B. Application of Traditional Trespass to Chattel to the Internet
The pressure on these rules has mounted with the rise of the
internet. Firms and individuals invest substantial amounts of capital
and effort to create servers and websites that are linked to the rest of
cyberspace via the internet. No technical wizardry is needed to realize
that the possibilities for invasions in cyberspace parallel those in
physical space. The most obvious illustration of these invasions is
spam-those mass messages sent by a single party to all sorts of peo-
ple who would rather not receive them. It is an open question whether
spam counts as a trespass if the spammer has not received any desist
message from an internet service provider or ordinary email users
(who are not shy to make their concerns known)." After all, ordinary
phone calls are not trespasses to chattels. But the analysis changes
radically once the phone caller or the spammer receives a specific no-
tice asking him to cease and desist. Any implied authorization of the
practice is negated by this express command. The rules here are simi-
lar to those that govern entering into or remaining on the land of an-
other individual.5
But why would one want to stop communications from others?
In some cases, the intrusions could be serious enough to overload the
computer and perhaps to cause it to crash. In other cases, it might clog
the limited capacity of the hard drive or put the owner of the system
to some burden to remove the emails in question. On multiple occa-
sions courts have held that these unauthorized intrusions count as de-
liberate trespasses to chattels, for which either damages or, more criti-
cally, injunctive relief should be allowed.1 It seems impossible to deny
14 See, for example, Brad Stone and Jennifer Lin, Spamming the World, Newsweek 42,43-
44 (Aug 19, 2002) (noting Verizon Online's suit against Al Ralsky, a bulk emailer, for crashing
its servers).
15 See, for example, Restatement (Second) of Torts at § 160 (cited in note 11) (liability for
"failure to remove thing placed on land pursuant to license or other privilege"); id § 161 (liabil-
ity for "[flailure to remove thing tortiously placed on land").
16 See, for example, eBay, Inc v Bidder's Edge, Inc, 100 F Supp 2d 1058, 1060-63 (ND Cal
2000) (granting a preliminary injunction even though Bidder's Edge's incursions occupied at
most only between 1.11 and 1.53 percent of the total load of eBay's servers); CompuServe, Inc v
Cyber Promotions, Inc, 962 F Supp 1015, 1019 (SD Ohio 1997) (granting a preliminary injunc-
tion to prevent defendant from continuing to send unsolicited emails to plaintiff's subscribers).
See also Oyster Software, Inc v Forms Processing, Inc, 2001 US Dist LEXIS 22520, *40 (ND Cal)
(stating that evidence that defendant made use of plaintiff's computer is all that is required to
sustain a trespass claim); Ticketmaster Corp v Tickets.com, Inc, 2000 US Dist LEXIS 12987, *16-
18 (CD Cal), affd, 248 F3d 1173 (9th Cir 2001) (denying injunction because of insufficient proof
of trespass and irreparable injury, but noting that the use of a computing system that interferes
with regular business is a trespass); America Online, Inc v IMS, 24 F Supp 2d 548, 550 (ED Va
1998) (holding that defendant committed a trespass to chattels by sending unauthorized bulk
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that the defendant has entered and used the plaintiff's facilities, which
must in principle count as some form of trespass. The rule on nominal
damages is not invoked because harms to equipment, real or threat-
ened, count as actual damages for which both monetary compensation
and injunctive relief are appropriate. This new technological innova-
tion offers no reason to bend the traditional rules of chattel trespass
to take into account the unique circumstance of the internet.
The key bone of contention, however, arises when defendant's
cyber-entry into the plaintiff's system causes neither disk damage nor
computer slow-down. In these cases, defendants have argued that the
nominal damage rule of the Restatement precludes any lawsuits at all.
Two cases in which I have written amicus briefs against allowing cy-
bertrespasses, eBay, Inc v Bidder's Edge, Inc" and Intel Corp v
Hamidi,"8 show the range of arguments that have been used to defeat
the claim for injunctive relief in cases of cybertrespass. The two situa-
tions were as follows.
eBay runs online auctions both great and small. Bidder's Edge
(BE) is (or more accurately was) an auction aggregator whose market
niche was to ease the costs of surfing the internet. It did so by con-
solidating information about the goods and prices available on multi-
ple auction sites. Initially BE sought a license from eBay to gather this
information. Similar licenses had been issued to other internet firms
such as Yahoo!. These licenses regulated the terms and conditions of
access, and also provided the aggregator with small compensation for
any business directed to the auction site. But when negotiations be-
tween eBay and BE broke down, BE sent its spiders (in other words,
probes to find information on the eBay site) on thousands of separate
occasions onto the eBay site to gather large amounts of information
that BE then displayed on its own site. The theoretical question is: If
one brackets any damage to eBay's equipment or capacity, is this en-
trance one that eBay is entitled to enjoin? The district court held the
unauthorized entry counted as a trespass to chattels which, in light of
its repetitive nature, justified injunctive relief.'9
In Hamidi, the defendant was a former employee of Intel who
surreptitiously obtained Intel's email registry and used it to send in-
flammatory emails to between eight thousand and thirty-five thou-
sand Intel employees on six specific occasions. Intel claimed loss of
productivity attributed to distracted and distraught employees and to
email messages to plaintiffs subscribers).
17 100 F Supp 2d 1058 (ND Cal 2000).
18 114 Cal Rptr 2d 244, 246 (App 2001) (upholding injunction enjoining a disgruntled
former employee of plaintiff from sending thousands of inflammatory emails to other employ-
ees), petition for review granted, 118 Cal Rptr 2d 546 (2002).
19 eBay, 100 F Supp 2d at 1069-70.
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its extended but unsuccessful attempts to keep Hamidi from cracking
the website. When Hamidi refused to stop his emails on Intel's re-
quest, Intel then sought and obtained injunctive relief that was af-
firmed on appeal by a divided court."
The defendants in both cases argued that the law of trespass to
chattels did not allow suit in the absence of damage to the chattel,
which was restricted to damage to its "condition, quality, or value,"
none of which were directly implicated in these cases. The basic ar-
gument is wholly doctrinal in its appeal to the language of the Second
Restatement. But as a functional matter, the claim appears to go
astray at two levels: first, in their claim that the damages were solely
nominal, and second, in their application of the nominal damage rule,
which in principle has no place in cybertrespass cases.
In both these cases, the definition of nominal damages is far
more expansive than its ordinary definition. If eBay or Intel had suf-
fered only nominal damages, then why would either firm spend enor-
mous sums of money in order to stop conduct that at some level they
regarded as deleterious to their businesses? The central insight in the
economics of litigation is that no plaintiff will sue to recover when the
costs of litigation exceed the expected recovery of suit. But in this
context the mystery disappears when the ordinary definitions of cau-
sation and damages are carried over from physical space to cyber-
space. Even in cases of unintended entry, the plaintiff would recover
harms that were caused directly, so long (at least in some versions of
the rule) as the harm is foreseeable. Intended consequences are al-
ways foreseeable, so that the only question is whether the respective
plaintiff can point to some form of consequential damages for which
recovery is appropriate. These damages have been routinely allowed
in cases of trespass to real property: "A trespasser is liable to respond
in damages for such injuries as may result naturally, necessarily, di-
rectly and proximately in consequence of his wrong.""
These rules carry over to cyberspace without missing a beat. In
America Online, Inc v IMS,2 the court held that AOL's loss of good
will when customers complained about the slow and balky operation
of their service was an element of actionable damages, above and be-
yond any physical damage to the system itself." Actions for trespass to
real property have also allowed actions for consequential damages re-
lated to the distress of an occupant that is not attributable to the as-
20 See Hamidi, 114 Cal Rptr 2d at 246.
21 Bouillon v Laclede Gaslight Co, 148 Mo App 462, 129 SW 401,402 (1910) (allowing re-
covery for nervous shock from defendant's servant's entry to property, even though plaintiff was
not personally assaulted).
22 1998 US Dist LEXIS 20448 (ED Va).
23 Idat*14n 13.
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sault of a wrongful entrant.4 In eBay v Bidder's Edge, eBay's damages
could easily include loss of good will if BE displays its listings incor-
rectly or in some unattractive format that makes its goods look infe-
rior to those sold on others' online auctions. The usual control of
trade dress and appearance matters for ordinary store windows. It
surely matters here. Likewise, employee distraction translates itself
into poor morale, which in turn becomes lower productivity and lower
profits. We do not have to estimate in the abstract how substantial
these damages are because we have a perfect case of revealed prefer-
ences. The willingness of firms to sue in order to defend the exclusive
use of their own space is evidence enough that the damages count.
Even if these are difficult to estimate, we know that they are far
greater than zero, so that the very inability to estimate the actual
damages offers yet an additional reason to award injunctive relief. On
this particular issue, the consequential losses should be estimated by
the same rules that apply in physical space. The common law works it-
self pure by not adopting ad hoc rules when none are required.
The question of damages can also work in a second way. The
usual rules of restitution hold that the plaintiff in a trespass action is
normally entitled to choose between the benefits conferred on the de-
fendant or the harm suffered by the plaintiff. In this case, the benefits
to both defendants are hard to estimate. But difficult to estimate is
one thing, nominal damages are quite another. With restitution dam-
ages as with tort damages, the difficulty in estimating substantial
damages offers no reason to deny the injunction. It only proves that
damages are inadequate as a matter of law. In a real sense, therefore,
cybertrespasses do not require us to jettison the older requirement of
actual damages. It only requires courts to interpret it sensibly in novel
contexts that repeat familiar patterns.
C. Application of Trespass to Real Property to the Internet
The second point goes to analogy and comparison. Does a web-
site look more like an ordinary chattel or more like real property?
Thus far I have pursued the chattels line that has been followed in the
cases. But, in principle, I think that the best answer comes from the
descriptions of cyberspace offered by those who champion the distinc-
tive nature of the cyber community, which appeals to an analogy
drawn from ordinary understandings of real property. Common lan-
guage speaks of internet "addresses," for, of course, individuals and
24 See, for example, Bouillon, 129 SW at 402-03 ("[Allthough the assault was not directed
against plaintiff and no physical injury was inflicted in the first instance, defendant was liable to
respond for such consequences as were proximate to his wrongful act."), citing Watson v Dilts,
116 Iowa 249,89 NW 1068 (1902).
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firms occupy private "sites" along the internet "highway." It also
speaks of the "architecture" of the internet, which may direct and in-
fluence conduct in both real and virtual "space."'' Reference is com-
mon to "cybersquatters." To think of a fixed internet site, or the
equipment that supports it, as though it were a chattel or personal
property is to miss the operative distinction of the earlier law, where
"movables" was often used as a synonym for personal property and
"immovables" as a synonym for real property. The blunt truth is that
an internet site is fixed in its cyberspace location; to change from one
address to another risks the loss of its customer base, just like any or-
dinary store runs the risk of losing its customers when it changes loca-
tions. In these circumstances, cyberspace looks and functions more
like real property than chattels. If one is forced to choose between the
two sets of rules, then manifestly the real property rules offer a better
fit.
The basic issues involved in these cybertrespass cases can be put
in yet another fashion. When the dust settles, if these defendants had
been allowed to continue just as they are, then the upshot is that the
defendant is entitled to receive an uncompensated compulsory license
to use the equipment of the plaintiff for his own advantage. It takes
little imagination to see that these cases therefore amount to the
claim that property rules should give way to forced transfers of
wealth. But in this case, much is lost in making this assumption. Our
two cases of course involve very different situations. In Hamidi, there
is no chance that Intel would ever enter into a deal that would allow
Hamidi to send spiteful emails to its employees. Given that transac-
tion costs are low, this is the correct result: There is no reason to allow
Hamidi's small gains to triumph over Intel's large costs. The initial al-
location of rights holds form. In eBay, the situation is different be-
cause auction aggregators like BE could work to the benefit of firms
like eBay by making their goods known to customers in a wider mar-
ket. But a lot depends on the terms and conditions of the license.
Here, moreover, the actual eBay licenses in use at the time of the BE
suit were complex affairs. The "eBay Deep Link, Trademark, Copy-
right, and Banner Ad Agreement," for example, in effect at the time
of the BE litigation, ran for seven pages and contained, inter alia, pro-
visions that govern how eBay licensees could "deep link" to the eBay
site; the default display of eBay content on the licensee's site; the pro-
tection and use of eBay's intellectual property and advertisement
content; basic compensation provisions including front end licensing
25 See, for example, Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace 89 (Basic 1999)
("The software and hardware that make cyberspace what it is constitute a set of constraints on
how you can behave.").
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fees and additional payments from the auction aggregator for visits
from its users to the eBay site and from eBay for each customer who
registers with eBay when referred to it by an auction aggregator; re-
strictions on assignments and sublicensees; provisions governing ter-
mination and renewal of licenses; limitations on warranties for conse-
quential damages; and provisions governing the cessation of services
during emergencies. No compulsory license scheme, even with com-
pensation, could hope to match the level of particularization and
standardization achieved by contract.2 6 This is a great improvement
over a rule that allows one person to take the property of another un-
til the system crashes or slows down.
D. Beyond Basic Trespass Law
The arguments thus far have been designed to show why strong
property rights for non-network elements function as well in cyber-
space as they do anywhere else. In fact, both of these cases can be
seen to raise issues that go beyond these points of trespass law. In
eBay, for example, the defendant could argue that some limitation on
eBay's ability to exclude was necessary to preserve a smooth-
functioning competitive market in which information about relative
prices flows quickly and easily between the parties. At one level, just
that goal is achieved by the voluntary agreements that eBay entered
with other auction aggregators. But in response it might be argued
that eBay's refusal to deal on certain terms should count as anticom-
petitive behavior. But if that were the case, then what is needed is an
action under the antitrust laws, not the trespass laws. That action will
be hard to maintain. In the usual case the plaintiff alleges that the de-
fendant had conspired to rig markets by some form of collective ac-
tion. eBay has only refused to do business with one firm that offers
both complement and substitute services on terms that it regarded as
appropriate. So long as we do not require ordinary auction houses like
Christie's or Sotheby's to allow any potential publicist to enter their
showrooms, it is hard to see how this claim of an antitrust violation
has much traction. But even if it does, it could be pleaded even if the
ordinary rules of trespass to real property carried over to cyberspace.
Likewise in Hamidi, one argument was that virtually everyone
who surfs the net will count as a trespasser, even in the absence of ac-
tual damages. Justice Kolkey put the point as follows: "[I]f a chattel's
receipt of an electronic communication constitutes a trespass to that
26 See Robert P. Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations, 84 Cal L Rev 1293, 1295 (1996) (noting how collective rights
organizations function to create royalties in settings that are, in fact, more complex than those
found here).
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chattel, then not only are unsolicited telephone calls and faxes tres-
passes to chattel, but unwelcome radio waves and television signals
also constitute a trespass to chattel every time someone inadvertently
sees or hears the unwanted program."27 But this argument is wrong in
all its analogies. Take first the telephone calls and the faxes, which are
sometimes a real annoyance. The missing pieces in the puzzle are the
rules on consent. In the ordinary situation a powerful set of social ex-
pectations make it clear that ordinary phone calls and faxes are not
trespasses, any more so than routine entries into department stores.
The operative principle in these cases is that consent is implied from
the circumstances until the owner of the property tells the entrant to
stay off (if not on the premises) or leave (if he is). Certainly, websites
that clamor for "hits" are widely understood to take all the ordinary
traffic that they receive, and we have little reason to think that any-
thing decided in Hamidi will reverse those expectations. But in this
case, one defendant was told to keep off, and here the background ex-
pectations have been shifted by explicit instructions, which should be
as binding in this context as they are in cases of entry to real property.
The problem that Justice Kolkey posits disappears unless we have a
tin ear to standard social practices. "Unwelcome" is an evasive word,
but it is not a synonym for unauthorized. There are lots of phone calls
and faxes that we would rather not receive. But there are relatively
few that we have forbidden. Unwelcome advances are reasons for re-
buff; but until the rebuff comes, the implied license continues to hold.
Hamidi crossed that line in ways that many others do not.
The analogies to radio waves and television shows are similarly
unavailing. The radio waves that run across the land do not pack any
cognitive wallop. Insofar as they are just waves, they are prime candi-
dates for the live-and-let-live rule of no liability, for everyone is better
off if the waves can be sent than if they were all quieted. Radio and
television signals that are heard and seen do pack a cognitive wallop
and, thus, cannot be easily subsumed under the live-and-let-live rule.
No doubt in most cases the ability to turn the knob will stop the tres-
pass. But think of the reaction if rogue broadcasters were able to take
over established frequencies in order to broadcast pornography into
households where it was not welcome. Hamidi is just another kind of
resourceful intruder. His case would never have gone to litigation if
he had identified himself unambiguously on arrival to Intel's servers.
E. First Amendment Issues
The question then arises whether Hamidi's effort to send a mes-
sage over Intel's server is protected by the First Amendment. First
27 Hamidi, 114 Cal Rptr 2d at 261 (Kolkey dissenting).
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Amendment issues would loom very large if Intel had sued Hamidi
for defamation. But the argument here goes not to the truth of his
message but to the mode of its distribution. In this case, the court of
appeals labored at great length over the question of whether the issu-
ance of an injunction counted as a form of state action ' in light of the
authority of Shelley v Kraemer,"' which held that a state could act (for
an analysis under the Equal Protection Clause) through legislative,
executive, and judicial action. That decision has always been very
troublesome because it suggests that the only thing that does not
count as state action is self-help--the very remedy that has proved
inadequate to keep Hamidi's emails from invading Intel's servers.
The court of appeals sought to avoid this difficulty by noting that
the neutral application of the general trespass law did not count as a
form of state action.0 That denial seems a bit forced linguistically, be-
cause what is really being said is that the state action in question is
justified because it counts as a neutral application of the trespass law.
The point can, however, be made still stronger when it is noted that
the decisive feature of private remedies is that they are sought by pri-
vate parties. The entire question of monopoly force that troubles the
application of state rules disappears from the equation except in
those rare situations like Marsh v Alabama3 where it is difficult to
draw the line between the state and the private owner of property
that looks (at least in some ways) to possess an unusual level of a lo-
cal government.
But in this case the decisive precedent is Rowan v United States
Post Office Department," which upheld a legislative rule33 that applied
to "pandering advertisements," under which "a person may require
that a mailer remove his name from its mailing lists and stop all fu-
ture mailings to the householder," noting that the right of privacy al-
lowed the householder to be "the exclusive and final judge of what
will cross his threshold."'" This rule certainly allows an owner to keep
peddlers and hawkers off his property. As the Court wrote, "To hold
28 See id at 253-55.
29 334 US 1, 14 (1948) ("[A] State may act ... either by its legislative, its executive, or its
judicial authorities; and the prohibitions of the [fourteenth] amendment extend to all action of
the State denying equal protection of the laws."), quoting Virginia v Rives, 100 US 313, 318
(1880).
30 See Hamidi, 114 Cal Rptr 2d at 253-54.
31 326 US 501, 509 (1946) (holding that Gulf Shipbuilding Corp, which owned all the
property in the town of Chickasaw, Alabama, could not prevent religious activity on its prop-
erty).
32 397 US 728, 738 (1970) (holding that a vendor has no right to send unwanted material
into the home of another).
33 Title III of the Postal Revenue and Federal Salary Act of 1967, Pub L No 91-375, 84
Stat 719 (1970), codified at 39 USC § 3008 (2000).
34 Rowan, 397 US at 729,736.
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less would tend to license a form of trespass and would make hardly
more sense than to say that a radio or television viewer may not twist
the dial to cut off an offensive or boring communication and thus bar
its entering his home."'"
Households are of course not businesses, but the differences do
not matter in the grand constitutional scheme of things. The house-
holder in Rowan did not want the mail delivered to his home for fear
that it would find its way into the hands of minor children, which is
the same sort of consequential damages applicable here. The general
common law right to exclude is not, of course, confined to pandering
materials, but extends to any information whatsoever. Because there
is no general pressure to prevent the delivery of ordinary mail, the
statutory protections did not authorize its interception by the Post Of-
fice. But it hardly follows that the individual householder could not
communicate to any particular person that he should not deliver any
mail to his home. Delivery, after notice, would count as a trespass,
even in the absence of a mechanism that allows the Post Office to re-
fuse to deliver the mail in the first place.
I can see no reason why the principles of exclusion that apply to
households do not apply to businesses as well. It is common practice
in many businesses to limit the connections that workers can make to
and from the firm. So long as these restrictions are spelled out as part
of the general employment relation, they do not amount to the in-
fringement of any right of any employee to receive or deliver mail.
Hamidi remains free to send his mail to Intel employees anywhere
else. But he is denied the convenience of using their servers to reach
this end. If the state can use its legislative power to assist personal
owners in protecting themselves against the intrusions of others, then
it seems as though they should be allowed to use the judicial agencies
of the state to the same end. To reach any other conclusion would be
odd in the extreme: Who would forfeit political power to the state if
the legal remedies it supplied in exchange were worthless? So long as
self-help is available in principle, then an injunction should be avail-
able to back it up.
CONCLUSION
In the end, therefore, a case as "simple" as cybertrespass leads us
down all sorts of strange paths. But it also confirms Kalven's original
insight about how the law works itself pure. There are many false
turns that can be taken, and many technical and doctrinal complexi-
ties that can be injected into cases of this sort. In some circumstances
we do need to modify traditional right situations to deal with new
35 Id at 737 (emphasis added).
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forms of property rights. But that proposition is not some unarticu-
lated but universal truth. Sometimes the old analogies work just fine.
So long as we keep our eye on the ball, we do not have to be fearful of
the imagined consequences that will follow by taking the older rules
of trespass and carrying them over to the brave new world of cyber-
space, which, when all is said and done, for legal purposes at least, is
neither as brave nor as new as it first appears.
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The Self-Defeating International Criminal Court
Jack Goldsmitht
Great expectations greeted the opening of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) on July 1, 2002. Kofi Annan captured these ex-
pectations when he expressed the hope that the new ICC would "de-
ter future war criminals and bring nearer the day when no ruler, no
state, no junta and no army anywhere will be able to abuse human
rights with impunity."' Chris Patten, the European Union Commis-
sioner for External Relations, echoed this theme when he stated that
the new Court's purpose was to "ensure that genocide and other such
crimes against humanity should no longer go unpunished."' Scores of
other world officials, human rights activists, and international law ex-
perts made similar predictions.
These are unrealistic dreams. They are unrealistic for many rea-
sons. But perhaps the most salient reason is that the ICC as currently
organized is, and will remain, unacceptable to the United States. This
is important because the ICC depends on U.S. political, military, and
economic support for its success. An ICC without U.S. support-and
indeed, with probable U.S. opposition-will not only fail to live up to
its expectations. It may well do actual harm by discouraging the
United States from engaging in various human rights-protecting ac-
tivities. And this, in turn, may increase rather than decrease the impu-
nity of those who violate human rights.
I lay out the mechanisms of ICC futility and perversity as follows.
Part I shows why the ICC will be incapable of punishing serious hu-
man rights abusers. Part II shows how the ICC will likely lead to less
rather than more punishment for human rights abusers. Part III asks
why the ICC framers might have designed a self-defeating institution.
The Conclusion qualifies the analysis and points to larger lessons.
t Professor of Law, The University of Chicago. Thanks to participants at workshops at the
University of Chicago Law School and the University of Virginia School of Law, and to Curtis
Bradley, Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Ryan Goodman, Jim Haynes, Derek Jinks, David Martin,
Duncan Snidal, Peter Spiro, Paul Stephan, and Adrian Vermeule for helpful comments, and Mark
Mosier for outstanding research. This Essay was completed before Professor Goldsmith took a
leave of absence to serve as Special Counsel to the General Counsel of the U.S. Department of
Defense. The views expressed in this Essay are those of Professor Goldsmith and do not reflect
the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the United States Government.
I Marlise Simons, Without Fanfare or Cases, International Court Sets Up, NY Times A3
(July 1, 2002).
2 Chris Patten, Why Does America Fear This Court?, Wash Post A21 (July 9, 2002).
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I. FUTILITY
The ICC was created in 1998 at an international conference
dominated by weak and middle powers and by nongovernmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) The Court has jurisdiction over genocide, crimes
against humanity, war crimes, and (at a later date) aggression. As the
opening quotations suggest, the ICC's aim is to punish and deter indi-
vidual perpetrators of these crimes.'
The ICC founders hoped to minimize political influence over
ICC decisionmaking. The ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia
and Rwanda were created by the UN Security Council. The United
States argued in Rome (the site of the ICC's founding conference)
that ICC prosecutions should be similarly limited to cases referred by
the Security Council. But the prevailing parties in Rome believed that
the Security Council--and in particular the opportunistic votes of
veto-wielding permanent members-was part of the problem. They
believed the Security Council's failure to establish international tribu-
nals for crimes in other trouble spots demonstrated that a Security
Council gatekeeper would preclude legitimate prosecutions and thus
undermine the aim of universal justice. Even worse, the permanent
member veto would make the permanent five (U.S., France, United
Kingdom, Russia, and China) and their close allies immune from
prosecution.
The ICC founders thought that the selective justice inherent in
such big-power politics would discredit the ICC process So over U.S.
objections, they created a prosecutor and court with powers entirely
independent of the Security Council. To be sure, the ICC treaty gives
the Security Council concurrent power to refer prosecutions to the
ICC.6 It also gives the Security Council the power to delay a prosecu-
tion for twelve-month renewable terms.' But this latter provision, if
successful, marks a significant change in the architecture of interna-
tional politics. It reverses the burden of Security Council inertia by
3 The main force at the conference was a group of sixty "like-minded" nations made up
primarily of European and commonwealth countries. See William A. Schabas, An Introduction to
the International Criminal Court 15 n 53 (Cambridge 2001) (listing countries). The like-minded
nations insisted on two of the ICC's core, and controversial, features: the diminution of a Secu-
rity Council veto and an independent prosecutor. See id at 15. So too did the over eight hundred
NGOs represented at the conference.
4 See also Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) preamble 4-5,
online at http://www.un.orgllaw/icc/statute/englishlrome-statute(e).pdf (visited Jan 10, 2003)
("Affirming that the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole
must not go unpunished and that their effective prosecution must be ensured by taking measures
at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.").
5 See Schabas, International Criminal Court at 65 (cited in note 3).
6 ICC Art 13(b).
7 ICC Art 16.
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permitting an ICC case to go forward as long as a single permanent
member supports prosecution and thus vetoes any delay. More
broadly, it means that an international institution not beholden to the
Security Council will have decisionmaking power over many of the
same peace and security issues typically governed by the Security
Council alone.8
The ICC can exercise its independent jurisdiction over perpetra-
tors of international crimes if the crimes are committed (a) by a na-
tional of a signatory party, or (b) on the territory of a signatory party.!
Two important consequences follow. The first is territorial liability over
non-signatories. The ICC has jurisdiction over crimes committed by a
non-signatory nation in the territory of a signatory nation. The second
is the traveling dictator exception. Leaders of non-signatory nations
can commit crimes in their territories without fear of prosecution.
Even if human rights abusers from non-signatory nations vacation in
The Hague, they cannot be arrested and tried by the ICC.
Why would the ICC founders reject jurisdiction over non-
signatory nations who commit crimes in their own territory, but em-
brace jurisdiction when those countries commit a crime in the terri-
tory of a signatory nation? This result was a compromise. Many na-
tions wanted the ICC to have universal jurisdiction, which would have
abolished the traveling dictator exception by allowing any signatory
nation to arrest anyone who committed an international crime any-
where. But other nations objected to universal jurisdiction as having
an uncertain basis under international law and as an excessive threat
to national sovereignty. The United States went further, objecting both
to universal jurisdiction and to non-signatory liability for crimes
committed in a signatory nation. Most nations in Rome disagreed with
the United States. The final compromise-one designed both to satisfy
some U.S. objections and to maximize ratifications-jettisoned the
relatively controversial universal jurisdiction idea but retained the
relatively (but only relatively) uncontroversial non-signatory liability
for crimes committed in a signatory state.'° The framers also went fur-
ther in the direction of non-signatory liability by allowing a non-
signatory nation to consent to the ICC's jurisdiction with respect to
8 See Schabas, International Criminal Court at 66 (cited in note 3).
9 See ICC Art 12(2).
10 The latter idea is relatively uncontroversial because it is premised on a signatory state's
territorial jurisdiction, which is delegated to the ICC. The delegation component is novel, but ter-
ritorial jurisdiction over crimes is not. For a more critical perspective on the delegation compo-
nent, see Madeline Morris, High Crimes and Misconceptions: The ICC and Non-Party States, 64 L
& Contemp Probs 13,43-47 (2001).
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"the crime in question" committed on its territory by another non-
signatory nation."
This is the fatal compromise that I believe will ensure that the
ICC fails in its aim of ending-or even diminishing-impunity for
international crimes. One reason why is obvious. The most salient class
of human rights violators during the past century has been oppressive
leaders who abuse their own people within national borders. Under
the traveling dictator exception, the ICC does not touch this class of
offenders, even if they travel abroad. Unless oppressive regimes ratify
the ICC (something few are expected to do), the ICC simply fails to
address the most serious human rights abuses.
There is an important qualification to the traveling dictator ex-
ception. If the Security Council refers a case involving an ICC non-
signatory to the ICC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it can
override national sovereignty and legitimate a prosecution against a
non-signatory or some other state otherwise outside ICC jurisdiction.2
However, such a referral remains subject to the permanent member
politics that so worried ICC supporters. And even when Security
Council inertia can be overcome for purposes of establishing ICC ju-
risdiction, the ICC itself lacks the institutional resources to ensure that
the defendants actually show up in The Hague.
13
Notorious human rights abusers tend to hide behind walls of na-
tional sovereignty, where they are hard to reach. Even with a Security
Council referral, the ICC is unlikely to punish the Husseins and future
Milosevics of the world because it is unlikely to get its grip on them.
The ICC has no inherent enforcement powers. It depends completely
on member states to arrest and transfer defendants. So the efficacy of
even Security Council-initiated prosecutions in this context depends
on the uncertain resolve of nations to use military or economic force
to extricate an oppressive leader from his country.
Consider the experience of the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in The Hague. The Tribunal has had
modest success in trying war criminals, and it is currently prosecuting
11 ICC Art 12(3) (cited in note 4). The ICC Preparatory Commission has tried to soften
this provision with its Procedural Rule 44(2), which provides that a State filing an Article 12(3)
declaration "accept[s] ... jurisdiction with respect to the crimes referred to in Article 5 of rele-
vance to the situation." ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence Art 44(2), online at
http://www.un.org/law/icc/prepcommi/prepfra.htm (visited Jan 10, 2003). This vague provision
does not, as many have stated, guarantee that Article 12(3) parties will consent to jurisdiction for
all crimes related to the consent. But even if it did, the Iraqs of the world could consent under
Article 12(3) and simply not show up. Rule 44(3) improves the anomaly of Article 12(3), but
does not fix it.
12 See ICC Art 13(b).
13 The analysis that follows also applies to leaders of signatory states that commit human
rights abuses but do not travel abroad.
[70:89
HeinOnline  -- 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 86 2003
The Self-Defeating ICC
Milosevic. But it was not the gravitational pull of the ICTY Charter
that lured these defendants to The Hague. Rather, it was U.S. military,
diplomatic, and financial might. U.S. military and diplomatic power
ousted Milosevic's and other unattractive regimes in the Balkans,
making a trial of Balkan leaders a possibility. And it was the United
States's threat to withhold a half-billion dollars in U.S. and Interna-
tional Monetary Fund (IMF) aid to the successor regime in Yugoslavia
that led to Milosevic's actual transfer to the ICTY."
The ICTY example illustrates the importance of military and
economic force to international criminal justice when human rights
abusers hide behind national borders. It also illustrates the obstacles
to the use of such force. Nations do not lightly expend national blood
and treasure to stop human rights abuses in other nations. The Euro-
peans were unwilling and unable to do so in the Balkans for years.
When the United States finally used extensive force in Kosovo in the
summer of 1999, it did so haltingly and in large part to protect the vi-
ability of NATO. The United States did not intervene to stop equal or
greater humanitarian tragedies in Chechnya, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone. The brute fact is that despite hundreds of thousands of deaths
caused by human rights abuses during the past decade and despite
millions of such deaths in the last century, no wellspring of support for
intervention has developed in the industrialized democracies that pos-
sess the military muscle to intervene and stop the abuses.
Bringing the most notorious human rights abusers to the ICC
would thus be hard enough even if the United States fully supported
the ICC. But for reasons we shall explore below, the United States
does not support the ICC. It openly and aggressively opposes it. The
United States' opposition will greatly magnify the ICC's inherent en-
forcement gap. The United States can sometimes be persuaded to en-
gage in humanitarian intervention if the intervention comports with
certain strategic interests. The leading contender to replace the United
States as world policeman, the European Union, lacks the budgetary
and political will to conduct any serious military actions outside
Europe. (Despite much talk in recent years, there is no foreseeable
prospect of the EU transforming itself to do otherwise.) So at best,
ICC power over recalcitrant oppressors will depend on uneven en-
forcement efforts by the United States when it suits U.S. strategic in-
terests (and when-if ever-the United States can overcome its objec-
tions to ICC participation). It is much more likely that the ICC will
fail to assert jurisdiction over recalcitrant oppressors at all, either be-
14 See Paul Ames, 'A Historic Moment' for Yugoslavia: $1.28 Billion is Pledged for Recon-
struction Fund, Houston Chron A25 (June 30,2001); Irena Guzelova and Stefan Wagstyl, US De-
cides to Continue Giving Aid to Belgrade: Yugoslavia White House Move Is Latest Sign of Interna-
tional Approval After the Arrest of Milosevic, Fin Times 8 (Apr 3,2001).
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cause it lacks a Security Council referral and thus will lack jurisdic-
tion, or because no nation will be willing to bring the defendants to
The Hague.
These are the main reasons why the ICC is not likely to end im-
punity for human rights abusers or deter future war criminals. Of
course, even if the ICC cannot try big-time human rights abusers, it
might be able to try less significant ones. There may be times when
signatory states (Nigeria and Sierra Leone are two possibilities) have
civil wars that involve gross human rights abuses, and in which the
prevailing or successor regime sends the defeated party to the ICC. Or
there may be a cross-border dispute in which a signatory captures a
perceived war criminal and sends him to The Hague.
These are the most likely possibilities, but they are far from cer-
tain. In the civil war context, victors will not lightly send losers to the
ICC for fear of dampening national conciliation efforts. (Recall that
the post-Milosevic regime sent Milosevic to The Hague only in the
face of extraordinary U.S. financial and diplomatic pressure; the Yugo-
slav government's decision to do so was unconstitutional under do-
mestic law," and continues to divide rump Yugoslavia today." Interna-
tional tribunals are not, as a general matter, viewed with favor by re-
gimes that succeed oppressors.7) When the losers are so broadly de-
tested that an ICC transfer seems desirable, the ICC's additional penal
effect is minimal. A similar analysis .applies to potential defendants
captured during cross-border wars. And in any event, cross-border
wars have not been the primary source for massive human rights
abuses in modern times; and any such abuses are not likely to involve
the self-selected ICC signatories.
I am not arguing that the ICC will have no effect whatsoever.
Surely it will. As the Palestinian response to Israeli military attacks in
July 2002 indicates, it will be a focal point for rhetorical assertions
about criminality even in cases in which the ICC clearly lacks jurisdic-
tion.'8 And its existence will make it easier (though perhaps not much
easier) to pressure signatory nations to turn over alleged human rights
abusers in their jurisdictions. The ICC will gather its share of defen-
dants-especially low- to mid-level human rights violators from signa-
15 See Carlotta Gall, Hague Tribunal Chief Says Yugoslavia Still Isn't Cooperating, NY
Times A8 (Oct 23,2001).
16 See Daniel Simpson, Milosevic Trial Leaves Most Serbs Cynical, NY Times A8 (Aug 9,
2002).
17 See Gary Bass, Stay the Hand of Vengeance: The Politics of War Crime Tribunals 286-88
(Princeton 2000); Jack Snyder and Leslie Vinjamuri, Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies of In-
ternational Justice at *16-35, working paper (2002) (on file with author).
18 See Harvey Morris, Legal Move to Halt Israeli Assassinations, Fin Times 13 (July 26,
2002). The ICC clearly lacks jurisdiction over this case because the occupied territories are nei-
ther a state party to the ICC nor a state capable of an Article 12(3) declaration.
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